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REVISITING THE NONPROFIT PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE NEED TO CLARIFY ELIGIBILITY 
Daniella Corcuera* 
The City of Detroit’s recent filing for bankruptcy has made the nation 
acutely aware of one uncomfortable fact: municipalities across the nation 
are struggling to make ends meet. As cities and towns attempt to find 
funding for services, previously quiet jurisdictions have begun to question 
charitable nonprofit tax exemptions. Of all the benefits received by 
nonprofit institutions, the property-tax exemption has become a notable 
source of contention. Local governments are now asking whether the 
institutions that have enjoyed the benefits of a property-tax exemption 
actually qualify for and/or deserve the financial benefit. As a result, cases 
challenging nonprofits have become common across the nation. Given that 
the number of nonprofits grew from 1,259,764 in 2010 to 1,574,674 in 
2011, the legal effects of this brewing battle are sure to be noticeable both 
locally and nationwide.1 
Every state offers a charitable nonprofit property-tax exemption.2 
Depending on the state, the power to issue a property-tax exemption is 
typically either granted to the legislature by that state’s constitution or 
mandated within the constitution itself.3 Until recently, this charitable tax 
exemption had gone relatively unquestioned because the benefits that these 
nonprofits provide to their local communities are numerous. Examples of 
charitable nonprofits include, among many others, universities and medical 
centers. These institutions are typically major employers for their regions, 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D./M.B.A. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law and Joseph M. Katz Graduate 
School of Business, 2014; B.A. 2011, Washington University in St. Louis. 
1 Nonprofits, URBAN INSTITUTE, http://www.urban.org/nonprofits/ index.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2013). 
2 Evelyn Brody, All Charities are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities are More Exempt 
Than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 625 (2010). 
3 Id. at 624. 
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and are important to the local economy.4 Additionally, these types of 
institutions provide services that benefit the community while attracting 
visitors and potential future residents.5 However, as these local 
governments have become more pressed for funding, the charm of these 
institutions has worn off, leading to feelings of resentment. Many 
municipalities are now itching to challenge these exemptions. 
This note will examine the implementation of, and issues related to, 
the property-tax exemption and compare various approaches to finding a 
satisfactory solution to the growing discontent without protracted litigation. 
Part I of this note will exemplify the changing treatment of the charitable 
nonprofit property-tax exemption by specifically examining the evolution 
of laws in Pennsylvania. Part II will compare solutions that have been 
suggested and implemented in cities across the nation. This section will 
explore the positive and negative aspects of each solution and discuss their 
relative levels of success. Part III will be a discussion of the branches 
responsible for solving the problem of how to consistently apply a non-
profit property tax exemption, and which branch should ultimately propose 
an answer: the courts, the legislature, the municipalities or the organizations 
themselves? 
PART I 
The charitable nonprofit property-tax exemption has recently made 
headlines in Pennsylvania. The origin of the Pennsylvania charitable 
exemption can be found in Article VII, § 2(a)(v) of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which states that “(a) The General 
Assembly may by law exempt from taxation: . . . (v) institutions of purely 
public charity, but in the case of any real property-tax exemptions only that 
portion of real property . . . which is actually and regularly used for the 
purposes of the institution.”6 From this constitutional power, the legislature 
specifically excluded charitable organizations from the Sales and Use Tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 Daphne A. Kenyon & Adam H. Langley, The Property-Tax Exemption for Nonprofits and 
Revenue Implications for Cities (2011), URBAN INST. 6 (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter 
.org/UploadedPDF/412460-Property-Tax-Exemption-Nonprofits.pdf. 
5 Id. 
6 PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
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under 72 P.S. § 7204(10).7 Any nonprofit seeking an exemption must first 
establish itself as a “purely public charity” under the Pennsylvania 
constitution.8 
The definition of a “purely public charity” has evolved over time. The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first established that “[i]n every such case 
as the public is the beneficiary, the charity is a public charity. As no private 
or pecuniary return is reserved to the giver . . . but all the benefit resulting 
from the gift or act goes to the public, it is a ‘purely public charity,’ the 
word ‘purely’ being equivalent to the word ‘wholly.’”9 The Court further 
added to this definition by stating that “an institution claiming to be 
benevolent or charitable that it, or the portion of its property, in respect to 
which exemption is claimed, must possess an eleemosynary characteristic 
not possessed by institutions or property devoted to private gain or profit.”10 
In YMCA of Germantown v. Philadelphia, the Court established a multi-
faceted test to determine whether an institution is a “purely public charity.” 
“First, whatever it does for others is done free of charge, or at least . . . the 
charges [are] nominal or negligible; second, that those to whom it render 
help or services are those who are unable to provide themselves with that 
the institution provides for them.”11 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further defined a “purely public 
charity” in West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of Prop. Assessment.12 The 
Court stated that being purely public required the institution to have an 
“open-admission policy.”13 That is, the services provided by the institution 
must be accessible to all members of the community. Additionally, the 
institution must have a recognized charitable purpose to be considered a 
charity.14 Clearly, the test for whether an organization qualified as a “purely 
public charity” according to the Pennsylvania constitution continued to 
evolve over time. 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7204(10) (2000), as discussed in Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 
1310–11. 
8 Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1312. 
9 Trs. of Acad. of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Taylor, 25 A. 55, 56 (Pa. 1892). 
10 YMCA of Germantown v. Philadelphia, 183 A. 204, 208 (Pa. 1936). 
11 Id. at 412. 
12 W. Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny 
County, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982). 
13 Id. at 1170. 
14 Id. 
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In 1985, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established the HUP test 
in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth. In this case, the Court set 
forth a five-pronged test to be used in determining whether an institution 
seeking a tax exemption is a purely public charity under the Pennsylvania 
constitution. The five criteria set forth by HUP are that an entity: 
(a) advances a charitable purpose; (b) donates or renders gratuitously a 
substantial portion of its services; (c) benefits a substantial and indefinite class 
of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) relieves the government of 
some of its burden; and (e) operates entirely free from private profit motive.15 
The Court made it clear that “the mere fact that an organization is a non-
profit corporation does not mandate that it should be exempt from 
taxation.”16 Once meeting the constitutional test set forth in the case, the 
institution would then have to meet the specific statutory criteria of the 
exemption they were seeking. 
Of course, since 1985, cases from all levels of the Pennsylvania court 
system have set forth different criteria in determining whether an institution 
meets the HUP test. The subsequent cases were more confusing than 
clarifying, and the courts often contradicted themselves, making it difficult 
to have any level of certainty on the outcome of a case. The same case in 
two different jurisdictions within Pennsylvania might have been decided in 
completely opposite ways. The HUP test was not applied consistently, 
leading to uncertainty throughout the state. 
In order to clarify the HUP test, the legislature passed the Institutions 
of Purely Public Charity Act in 1997, more commonly known as Act 55.17 
Act 55 was meant to provide guidance in determining whether an institution 
met the five criteria of the HUP test, thereby leading to a more uniform 
application throughout the state. This act specifically listed the ways in 
which an institution might meet each prong of the HUP test, even detailing 
how an institution must distribute its revenue and compensate its directors 
in order to be considered free from a private profit motive.18 Due to the 
passage of Act 55, the amount of litigation related to charitable nonprofit 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1982). 
16 Id. at 1316. 
17 10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 372(b) (1997). 
18 10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 375. 
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property-tax exemptions decreased.19 However, the legislation brought with 
it a critical discussion about whether an organization only needed to meet 
Act 55 to satisfy the HUP test, or if that organization still needed to satisfy 
the HUP test in order to meet the constitutional requirement, with Act 55 
simply providing additional criteria.20 Regardless of this debate, Act 55 was 
generally considered applicable until 2012. 
In April 2012, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania answered the 
question of the relevance of Act 55 in Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. 
v. Pike County Bd. of Assessment Appeals.21 In this case, the Court stated 
that “the General Assembly cannot displace our interpretation because ‘the 
ultimate power and authority to interpret the Pennsylvania Constitution 
rests with the judiciary, and in particular with this Court.’”22 Ultimately, “to 
receive an exemption without violating the Constitution, the party must 
meet the definition of ‘purely public charity’ as measured by the test in 
HUP. If it does so, it may qualify for exemption if it meets the statute’s 
requirements. Act 55, however, cannot excuse the constitutional 
minimum—if you do not qualify under the HUP test, you never get to the 
statute.”23 The majority unequivocally stated that Act 55 does not provide 
any sense of security in meeting the constitutional minimum. The HUP test 
is the test that will determine the outcome of cases. 
Given that the HUP test was so inconsistently applied throughout 
jurisdictions in the state, the Bobov case has generated concern from 
institutions. From 1997 to 2012, many organizations were given 
unquestioned property-tax exemptions under Act 55. Now, these previously 
exempt institutions will have to prove their qualification for exemptions 
under the HUP test. Due to the economic difficulty that plagues 
municipalities across the state, it is extremely likely that the exemptions of 
many charitable nonprofits will be questioned in the next coming years. 
Already, in the state’s two major cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, city 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Richard T. Frazier & Stanley J. Kull, “Purely Public Charities” in Pennsylvania. Back to the 
Future-Again (May 2012), http://www.saul.com/publications-alerts-833.html. 
20 Id. 
21 Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 44 A.3d 3 (Pa. 
2012). 
22 Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, 44 A.3d at 7 (citing Stilp v. Pennsylvania, 905 A.2d 918, 948 
(2006)). 
23 Id. at 9. 
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councils and county officials have called for hearings to explore whether or 
not certain institutions should receive property-tax exemptions.24 The focus 
has been largely on nonprofits that resemble a typical corporation—those 
that earn significant revenues have been particularly targeted. The success 
of this initial questioning remains to be seen. 
PART II 
The legislative and judicial evolution of Pennsylvania charitable 
nonprofit property-tax exemption laws is a representative example of the 
difficulty of establishing a consistently applicable definition that all parties 
will recognize, even in financially-strapped times. Nationwide, 
organizations in many local jurisdictions are dealing with successful 
challenges to their own state’s exemption. For example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court recently decided that a nonprofit hospital’s charitable use of 
property did not constitute a charitable use, and therefore that hospital did 
not qualify for a property-tax exemption.25 Minnesota, a state which was 
experiencing similar difficulties in defining charitable nonprofit status, 
passed a statute that aimed to provide clarity to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s established test.26 However, this statute has not stopped cities from 
challenging the exemption status of big and small nonprofits alike.27 In the 
absence of a satisfactory answer regarding a state’s specific criteria for 
determining this property-tax exemption, municipalities have begun to look 
for alternative methods of taxing or receiving payment from charitable 
nonprofits. This has led to a few different proposals, which will be 
examined below. 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 See Heard on the Hill/In City Hall: Clarke says AVI Needs More to Make it Work (Jan. 31, 
2013), http://www.phillyrecord.com/2013/01/heard-on-the-hill-in-city-hall-clarke-says-avi-needs-more-
to-make-it-work; Tony LaRussa, Fitzgerald tells Allegheny County Nonprofits to Justify Tax-Exempt 
Statuses, TRIBLIVE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://triblive.com/news/ allegheny/3342710-74/county-fitzgerald-
exempt#axzz2JegonrHn. 
25 Antonio Senagore, Are Nonprofit Hospitals Charitable Institutions?, 99 ILL. B.J. 96 (2011). 
26 Minnesota Council of Nonprofits, Charitable Property-Tax Exemption Redefined, http://www 
.minnesotanonprofits.org/mcn-at-the-capitol/past-successes/charitable-property-tax-exemption-
redefined. 
27 Jean Hopfensperger, Cities Ask Tax-Exempt Groups to Pay for Services, STARTRIBUNE 
(Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/local/ 188619381.html?refer=y. 
2013] REVISITING THE NONPROFIT PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION 161 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.57 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
The policy responses that have emerged in response to this problem 
are varied. The most common answer to the question of collecting revenue 
from nonprofits is the PILOT program. A PILOT is a “payment in lieu of 
taxes.” Rather than paying a property tax, organizations can choose to enter 
into voluntary agreements in which they agree to pay some amount 
(typically a percentage of the tax they would have to pay if they weren’t 
exempt) to the local municipality. The sum may be designated for a 
particular purpose or just given to the local government for general 
distribution.28 PILOT agreements may vary from a one-time payment to a 
long-term contract.29 The idea behind PILOTs is that, since property tax 
revenues are lost, the charitable institution helps to ease the burden on the 
local government, without having to pay the full amount of tax on their 
property. PILOT programs are voluntary.30 
The city of Boston currently has one of the most widely recognized 
PILOT programs. Though data on PILOTs is not consistently tracked, it is 
estimated that, in fiscal year 2010, Boston received $34,048,428 in PILOT 
revenue.31 This program generates more funds than any other PILOT 
program in the United States.32 Around 52% of the land area in Boston is 
considered to be property-tax exempt.33 Owners of this land include 
governmental bodies as well as charities such as churches, synagogues, 
educational institutions, and health care organizations.34 
Even though the city of Boston has enjoyed significant success with its 
PILOT program, it has still attempted to evolve its program over time. 
PILOTs became a seriously considered solution in Boston due to the 
creation of the Boston PILOT task force in 2009. The task force was 
created “with the objectives of making PILOT contributions more 
consistent across institutions, and increasing revenue from PILOTs.”35 The 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 Eric A. Lustig, The Boston City Pilot Task Force: An Emerging Best Practice?, 44 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 601, 602 (2010). 
29 Kenyon & Langley, supra note 4, at 6. 
30 Lustig, supra note 28, at 602. 




33 Lustig, supra note 28, at 606. 
34 Id. 
35 Kenyon & Langley, supra note 4, at 7. 
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city used this task force to set the basis for amounts of PILOT agreements 
and determined an appropriate standard of payment at the level of 25%.36 A 
deduction for “extraordinary community services” allowed a deduction of 
up to 50% of the PILOT for community benefits.37 These community 
benefits must, among other things, be quantifiable and directly benefit the 
city of Boston’s residents. 
The recommendations of this task force were set out as an attempt to 
remedy the “uneven nature” of PILOT payments, which meant that certain 
institutions were “carrying the weight of many at a time when the City 
need[ed] a fair and consistently executed PILOT program to maintain its 
fiscal health.”38 The lack of consistent agreements between charitable 
nonprofits and local governments is one downside to PILOT programs 
nationwide. Since the programs are voluntary (due to the fact that they are 
not statutorily regulated), they are incredibly inconsistent and do not 
necessarily correlate with the amount of tax-exempt property owned and 
used by an institution.39 Additionally, there are limits on how much 
leverage a municipality can exert on the nonprofits that it hosts.40 
Negotiations for PILOT programs can often become tense, especially in 
lean economic times. Ultimately, every state provides for a charitable 
nonprofit property-tax exemption, and no institution wants that right to be 
entirely infringed. Some institutions may even resent the idea of having to 
negotiate a PILOT, since this may be taken as an admission of lack of 
charitable exemption status. 
Finally, depending on the reach of certain nonprofits, a PILOT 
program may not fully discourage judicial challenges to that organization’s 
exemption status. Although a nonprofit may agree to pay a percentage of its 
would-be tax in a PILOT, depending on the terms, their exemption may still 
be challenged by an organization that was not privy to the PILOT 
agreement. Since one of the supposed benefits of entering into a PILOT 
program is the security of knowing that your charitable exempt status is 
                                                                                                                           
 
36 Mayor’s PILOT Task Force: Final Report & Recommendations, supra note 31, at 11. 
37 Id. at 12. 
38 Id. at 7. 
39 Id. 
40 Lustig, supra note 28, at 619. 
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recognized by the local government, the fact that you may still be drawn 
into litigation is an obvious downside to PILOTs. 
Similar issues exist with the SILOT, a relative of the PILOT. A SILOT 
is an agreement of “services in lieu of taxes.” Such an agreement means 
that nonprofits would provide valuable services to local residents rather 
than making a payment to a municipality.41 SILOTs and PILOTs can often 
be merged, with an organization pledging a certain amount in payment as 
well as a certain amount of services to be provided to local residents. This 
may even involve forming a partnership with the municipality to “foster 
economic growth, which can increase a city’s tax base.”42 An example of 
this is the relationship between the city of New Haven and Yale 
University.43 However, as previously discussed, such agreements can be 
contentious to negotiate. A SILOT may make it especially difficult to reach 
any consistent agreement considering that it is typically more difficult to 
quantify services over payment. PILOT programs are already deemed to be 
somewhat inadequate in ensuring that every nonprofit pays its fair share—
the additional issues associated with trying to calculate the worth of general 
services provided by a specific organization may complicate the 
establishment of a SILOT. 
Logically, there is also a significant issue of continuity with PILOT 
and SILOT programs. Since these agreements are voluntary, there is no 
guarantee that they will create a continuous stream of revenue for a city. At 
any time, an institution may decide that it no longer wishes to participate in 
a PILOT or SILOT program, and simply choose to renege on its agreement. 
Such is the case in the City of Philadelphia. In 1994, Philadelphia 
implemented a PILOT and SILOT program calling on all nonprofit charities 
located in the city to “contribute some portion of their assessed property tax 
burden to the city.”44 The city-wide PILOT/SILOT program was adopted by 
Executive Order.45 The specific program details included: 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 Kenyon & Langley, supra note 4, at 7. 
42 Id. at 8. 
43 Id. 
44 Pamela J. Leland, Property-Tax Exemption and Municipal Revenue: Philadelphia’s Efforts to 
Solicit Payments-in-Lieu-of-Taxes from Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
L., June 1999, available at http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol1iss4/art_1.htm. 
45 Id. 
164 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:155 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.57 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
1. A PILOT/SILOT payment equal to 40% of the annual property 
tax it would owe if not tax-exempt. 
2. An incentive program whereby those organizations with 
agreements in place by December 1, 1994, would have a reduced 
rate of 33% of the annual property tax. 
3. The calculation of the annual property tax would be based on 
assessed values held by the Board of Revision of Taxes and the 
City’s millage rate. 
4. The School District would be a full participant in the process 
(receiving 55% of any moneys received). 
5. Up to 33% (one-third) of the PILOT obligations could be replaced 
with SILOTs. 
6. All PILOT/SILOT agreements would be overseen by a 
PILOTs/SILOTs Advisory Board and formalized by a contract 
between the nonprofit, the City, the School District, the Center 
City District and any other special service districts which may be 
created. 
7. Special provisions would be made for any nonprofit organization 
found to meet the 5 criteria in the HUP test.46 
There were, of course, exceptions to the above provisions. For 
example, the City agreed to include a “hardship” status, by which an 
organization could prove financial hardship and only have to contribute a 
minimum payment.47 Additionally, if an organization was granted “home 
free” status by the Advisory Board, meaning that they met the requirements 
of the HUP test,48 they would not be expected to participate in the 
Voluntary Contribution Program.49 By July 1, 1996, the City had negotiated 
agreements with 42 institutions.50 These institutions consisted of healthcare 
organizations, educational institutions, and professional or scientific 
societies.51 All the agreements were for a period of five years.52 




48 Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1312. 
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The City quickly ran into trouble with this program. One significant 
issue was that, in initial reports, the city expected to receive around $24 
million annually from the healthcare and educational community alone. In 
reality, Philadelphia only received around $9.4 million.53 This reduced 
revenue can be attributed to the amount of organizations that were granted 
hardship status, and also multiple reassessments of the values of properties 
which they owned. These reassessments significantly lowered the value of 
their properties, which lowered actual revenues.54 
Another factor that may have contributed to lower revenues is that of 
Philadelphia’s approach in negotiating with institutions. The City was 
weary of alienating nonprofits with this program, and so negotiations were 
carried out in a “kind and gentle” manner.55 The City of Philadelphia did 
not want the program to come across as harsh, and it was willing to work 
with organizations in order to make agreements seem less one sided.56 
However, in doing so, it ultimately came to varying terms with each 
organization, meaning that the program was not implemented uniformly.57 
As long as the City of Philadelphia felt that it was receiving an appropriate 
benefit from the deal, there was no need to ensure that each agreement was 
uniformly proportional to the size and value of each individual 
organization.58 
Finally, the political circumstances surrounding the PILOT/SILOT 
program contributed to an overall feeling of distrust. Out of the 300 
nonprofits that were examined, only 45 entered into PILOT agreements.59 
As mentioned above, these organizations consisted of healthcare, 
educational, and professional associations. There was a noticeable lack of 
older and wealthier arts and culture organizations.60 Such organizations 
were granted “home free” status.61 Although it is possible that these 
organizations did meet the HUP test and should have been considered to be 
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exempt from the program, the fact that the mayor of Philadelphia had 
designated arts and culture as a crucial aspect of his academic development 
plan meant that many looked at the absence of these organizations with 
skepticism.62 In fact, representatives of the nonprofit community felt that 
the purpose of the program had been to target participating organizations 
from the beginning, and was merely devised to look equal on its face.63 
Due to the issues plaguing the Philadelphia PILOT/SILOT program, 
many of the originally participating organizations chose not to renew their 
agreements. Some agreements were re-negotiated for significantly lower 
sums. In 2009, Philadelphia had PILOT agreements with 17 institutions that 
brought in $686,922.64 The most significant contribution was $275,000 
from a retirement community.65 The largest nonprofit organizations, such as 
the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel University, Temple University, and 
the Children’s Hospital of Pennsylvania, did not have PILOT agreements.66 
After the initial five-year agreements expired, most of these larger 
institutions declined to renew their PILOT agreements. As such, the PILOT 
program is generally recognized to have been a very short-term success. 
It is worth noting that, aside from its initially shaky ground, the 
Philadelphia PILOT/SILOT program may have also been negatively 
impacted by the passage of Act 55.67 Part of the initial leverage that the City 
had in negotiating contracts was that cases surrounding the HUP test had 
left determination of exempt status muddled. Once Act 55 was passed, the 
requirements became much clearer, and it was generally considered easier 
to prove an exempt status. The legislative measure essentially eliminated 
the fear that an organization’s status would be challenged successfully.68 
Therefore, many nonprofits decided that the minimized risk provided no 
incentive to enter into PILOT programs, since their general purpose was to 
provide some protection against threats of litigation. Philadelphia’s 








67 Hosp. Utilization Project, 487 A.2d at 1316–17; 10 P.S. §§ 371–385 (1997). 
68 Campisi, supra note 64. 
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PILOT/SILOT program simply could not withstand the test of legislative 
change. 
Although PILOTs and SILOTs are the most popular type of agreement 
between municipalities and nonprofits, they are not a universal panacea. 
Depending on the community, local governments that do not heavily rely 
on income tax revenue and cities in which nonprofits do not own substantial 
real estate would not see any significant benefit from establishing a 
PILOT/SILOT programs with their local nonprofits.69 Instead, 
municipalities may look to charge exempt organizations user fees, special 
assessments, and municipal services fees.70 User fees involve payment “for 
services like garbage collection, water, and sewer.”71 A municipal service 
fee is related to the user fee. An organization is charged a fee for use of 
services, though the fee may not necessarily be related to how much of a 
local service that property uses.72 Examples of this fee include street-light 
and drainage fees.73 A special assessment may be used to pay for municipal 
improvements that benefit the piece of property that is tax exempt.74 
Additionally, municipalities may choose to levy “special tariffs, such as 
tuition taxes, on groups that use nonprofit services.”75 Some states may also 
choose to reimburse cities for lost revenue due to property-tax 
exemptions.76 This is currently the case in Connecticut and Rhode Island.77 
However, given that most states are experiencing budget issues, it is 
unlikely that this type of plan will become widespread. 
PART III 
Given the varying degrees of efficacy that PILOTs, SILOTs, and 
municipal and other fees have had in easing the strain caused by the issue of 
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nonprofit tax exemptions, it is clear that there has been no singular 
approach that has uniformly shown a level of success. The effectiveness of 
each solution depends greatly on the structure of each municipality and the 
way they collect revenue. It is important to the longevity of any program 
that a state or local solution be applied consistently, predictably, and 
uniformly. Any discussion of a uniform solution must address the issue of 
who should establish the solution: the legislature, the courts, the 
municipalities, or the organizations? 
Every state has a charitable tax exemption.78 Though the requirements 
vary from state to state, each state’s exemption has generally been specified 
in a state statute or state court.79 In about half of the states, the state 
constitution includes a mandate exemption for charities.80 Given the 
example in Part I, it is not unusual for an exemption to be defined by both 
the courts and the legislature over time. Therefore, one way to create a 
more uniformly applicable solution to a definition may be through either of 
these channels. For example, state legislatures may choose to narrow the 
scope of the property-tax exemption.81 The legislature may choose to pass a 
stricter definition of what is required of a nonprofit organization in order to 
qualify for a charitable property-tax exemption.82 However, in many states, 
any measure passed by the legislature, particularly one that is related to an 
interpretation of a constitutional mandate, may ultimately be interpreted by 
the courts. Consider the history of the HUP test and Act 55 discussed in 
Part I.83 Although the legislature passed Act 55 with the intent to clarify any 
ambiguities introduced throughout the court’s interpretations, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania ultimately decided that the Act simply could not be 
given greater weight than the court established test. In some states, such as 
Illinois, a supreme court may decide that the legislature has no place in 
defining any constitutional terms, thereby restricting legislative powers.84 
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Another drawback to putting the responsibility of unambiguously 
defining qualifications for property-tax exemption on the state legislature is 
the issue of time. Any dramatic overhaul will, realistically, not occur 
quickly.85 Indeed, passing any law (particularly laws on such a contentious 
issue) requires, at a minimum, navigating a political maze, listening to 
commentary from the public and interested parties, and voting to pass the 
measure. Any major change in state law will, most likely, not be easy. The 
complexity of this issue makes it even more unlikely that any proposed 
legislation would pass quickly. Considering the amount of money at stake 
for both the organizations and the municipalities, it is safe to bet that neither 
party will let any adverse change in law occur without a fight. 
Another potential option is to leave the task of clearly and uniformly 
defining charitable property-tax exemptions to the state court system. Of 
course, any challenge to an organization’s property-tax exemption status is 
brought in the court system, and nonprofit entities have had success in 
defending their status in state supreme courts.86 Therefore, it does make 
sense that courts are best situated to finally clarify each state’s 
requirements. However, there are drawbacks to this approach. Most 
significantly, different local courts can often interpret very similar fact 
patterns in a variety of ways. While some counties may view actions such 
as charging fees for services or high executive compensation as deal 
breakers in determining an organization’s property-tax exemption status, 
other counties may not be so quick to judge.87 In this way, courts have 
actually increased ambiguity with regard to the common factors that are 
raised in challenging an institution’s exemption status.88 There may also be 
issues in the way different levels of state courts apply their analyses. Again, 
using the example of Pennsylvania, prior to the decision of the Bobov case, 
lower courts were willing to apply both HUP and Act 55 more strictly, 
while the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted a broader definition.89 
Additionally, most court systems do not have the reputation of moving 
along quickly, meaning that any definitive answer may take a long time to 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 Kenyon & Langley, supra note 4, at 9. 
86 KENYON & LANGLEY, supra note 78, at 13. 
87 Id. at 13–14. 
88 See Kenyon & Langley, supra note 4, at 4; supra notes 13–17. 
89 See Brody, supra note 2, at 627; supra notes 14–16. 
170 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 32:155 
 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.57 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
develop. Ultimately, the courts may not be the best channel to rapidly lead 
to a more uniform approach in determining property-tax exemption. 
The argument can also be made that each municipality should be 
allowed to determine which property-owning nonprofits are eligible for an 
exemption.90 This would be particularly effective in remedying the 
geographic mismatch between the services and benefits provided by a 
particular nonprofit and the actual lost property tax revenue.91 Oftentimes, 
the services offered by an organization can be spread throughout a 
particular region, while the bulk of the lost revenue may be concentrated 
within the specific host municipality.92 In this circumstance, it seems 
reasonable to give the power of deciding whether that organization should 
be given a property-tax exemption to the municipality which will be most 
greatly affected by that decision. Only one state, Virginia, has used this 
approach, so it is difficult to gauge whether this would be an effective way 
of remedying existing issues.93 Additionally, some municipalities may be 
uncomfortable with drastically changing their approach to property tax, 
particularly in those instances where such changes would affect all property 
owners.94 
One of the most widely implemented solutions has been for 
organizations to come to individual agreements with their municipalities, 
giving both the municipality and the organization some say in the outcome. 
It is true that PILOT and SILOT programs can be contentious to negotiate 
and may be an unreliable source of revenue.95 Tense negotiations could 
ultimately lead to an organization’s decision to raise its fees or cut services 
and benefits to a community. Nonprofit organizations that are large regional 
employers could also choose to cut back on their employee counts in order 
to make up the difference in net profits after paying large amounts of 
taxes.96 However, PILOTs/SILOTs are ways to ensure that nonprofits pay 
for the use of services and contribute necessary revenue to their host 
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municipality.97 These programs can also help to relieve some of the tension 
felt between a large nonprofit and its community, particularly during lean 
economic times. 
Ultimately, different municipalities have different needs. While some 
local governments might greatly benefit from a systematic PILOT/SILOT 
program, others would see little increase in revenue. A true solution must 
be a collaborative approach between all the levels of state leadership.98 
While “[m]any of the flaws of PILOTs can be addressed by adopting a 
systematic program,” the voluntary and temporary nature would have to be 
addressed by the legislature and the courts.99 Alternatively, while the 
legislature and the state court system may seek to specify qualifying 
criteria, unavoidable ambiguity may mean that only an agreement between 
the local government and the organization would give either a chance of 
avoiding litigation. What makes sense in theory may not be practically 
successful, and so no one approach can be designated as the best approach. 
Rather, each state must be responsible for determining the most beneficial 
path for its cities and counties. 
CONCLUSION 
The charitable property-tax exemption has been a source of contention 
between nonprofits and their host municipalities for years. Due to the 
economic slowdown, financially strapped cities and counties are more 
aware of lost tax revenue as a result of this exemption. Pennsylvania is just 
one example of the continually evolving definition of different criteria set 
forth by both the state legislature and the court system in determining 
exemption status. Many different solutions, such as PILOT/SILOT 
programs and municipal service fees, have been proposed and 
implemented, but their relative successes have been varied. A resolution of 
the negative feelings between local residents, local governments and 
nonprofit organizations must be achieved through collaboration between the 
state legislature, the state court system, the local municipalities, and the 
organizations themselves. Any systematic and permanent solution must be 
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cognizant of the services a host municipality provides to a nonprofit and the 
benefits that the municipality receives from the nonprofit. 
